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T
he petroleum industry has
increasingly looked to the High
North during the last few decades,
as global demand for energy has grown
and as the Arctic ice cover has shrunk
rapidly due to climate change, facilitating
access to the resources that once lay
beneath it. Moreover, energy companies
are interested in the area because it
is largely seen as politically stable and
predictable – in contrast to the Middle
East and North Africa.
While political disagreements do
exist in the north, at the moment the
negotiating environment is generally
positive, framed by dialogue and
co-operation. Nonetheless, it is important
to understand the current and potential
underlying political disagreements
which could in the future give rise
to conflict and may, in turn, hinder
industrial development. Familiarity with
the history of the region as well as the
current social and strategic dynamics of
the area will not only allow for a greater
understanding of how conflicts may arise
but also enable actors to recognise and
respond to triggering events. Norwegian
foreign and economic policy and politics
set the scene for the energy industry.
However, the industry itself is also an
important political actor on both the
national and international scene.
The maritime areas surrounding
Svalbard are disputed, and the main
question is whether they should be
regarded as part of the Norwegian
mainland continental shelf or whether
they should be regulated by the
treaty concerning the archipelago
of Spitsbergen signed on 9 February
1920, which became known first as
the Spitsbergen Treaty and then as the
Svalbard Treaty. The treaty gives Norway
‘full and absolute sovereignty over the
islands and their territorial waters’;
1
it
specifies that ‘all parties of the Treaty
shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing
and hunting, including all commercial
operations’;
2
however, all of the above
is ‘subject to the observance of local
laws and regulations’.
3
Unlike Norway,
most other countries support the
view that the treaty regulates the area
surrounding Svalbard. This question
must be resolved before Norway can
open it up for hydrocarbon exploration
and exploitation. Although Norwegian
politicians publicly present this as an
issue of environmental challenges and
international law, in the background,
a game of power, economic policy
and commercial interests, as well as
geopolitics, is underway.
The Norwegian approach to
regulating the area between 1920,
when Norway was awarded sovereignty
of the Svalbard archipelago, through
to the late 1960s can be labelled a
‘non-policy’, reflecting the fact that
Norway largely focused on not provoking
any international tension.
4
This changed
from the late 1970s and up to the
mid-1990s, as Norway imposed several
new regulations; however, it did little
to control the activity in the area. From
the late 1990s, by contrast, Norway
has demonstrated a more offensive
attitude. This has, in turn, led to several
international incidents, most notably the
Elektron incident of 2005,
5
and the British
decision to host a conference about
the status of the area without inviting
Norway, in 2006.
6
The Norwegian government has no
publicly stated strategy for solving the
political challenge of extraction rights in
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The petroleum industry has greatly increased its activities in the Arctic, and nations
are eager to award new licences for further hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation.
The European High North has become a sought-after region in this regard, and recent
discoveries in the Hoop High fields and other areas along the edge of the maritime zone
around the Svalbard archipelago have again created debate about the underlying judicial
and political challenges that may spark international conflict. Gjert Lage Dyndal discusses
the disputed status of the area and argues that the petroleum industry may prove central
to a compromise solution.
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the maritime areas surrounding Svalbard;
instead, the topic is not officially
considered to be up for negotiation.
Norway’s preferred, and possibly only,
option has been to sit still and try to
build a long-term legal claim for its rights
to these resources. The Norwegian
authorities appear to hope that the
longer the Norwegian-designed political
and legal framework remains in effect
– mainly the Fisheries Protection Zone
established in 1977 – the greater their
chances of generating agreement and,
eventually, customary law on the basis
of their own perspectives.
Rather than just a judicial case,
however, the issue of rights over the
area is directly related to strategic
interests and any decision has a
decidedly political basis, with many
actors involved, including Russia and the
UK – perhaps the two main opponents
of the Norwegian position – as well as
the influential international petroleum
industry. In all three countries, national
policies are closely interwoven with
domestic politics and core industries.
Furthermore, over the past couple of
decades the world has also witnessed
increased incidence of nationalisation of
the petroleum industry – making political
and industrial interests even more closely
intertwined.
Given the above, this article
proposes that the nations and industry
involved in Arctic extraction together may
contribute to solving the longstanding
dispute over the status of the maritime
area around Svalbard. Once sufficient
economic interests are in play, and once
the extent of the hydrocarbon deposits in
the area is clear, the combinations of the
two will likely provoke either conflict or
hopefully lead to a compromise solution.
The Longstanding Political
Challenge
The relevant early history starts with
the Dutch explorer Willem Barents,
who discovered the islands in 1596 and
named the main island ‘Spitsbergen’.
7
The coastline was used by Dutch, English,
Danish and Norwegian hunters, mainly
for the production of animal oil in the
sixteenth century, an industry which
declined in the following century. Both
England and the union of Denmark and
Norway (which was in existence between
the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries)
claimed Spitsbergen, while the Dutch
argued for free access as part of the high
seas.
8
The issue of ownership was never
resolved.
Historically, up to the agreement
of the Svalbard Treaty in 1920, the area
had been a terra nullius – a ‘no man’s
land’ – or, for business ventures, a terra
communis – a ‘free-for-all land’.
9
As both
national and private activities increased,
however, the need for a regulatory
system arose. Sweden and Norway,
formally in a union between 1814 and
1905, first attempted to annex the islands
in 1871 but this was prevented by Russia.
When Norway gained independence from
Sweden in 1905, Norway made several
attempts to establish sovereignty over
the islands (in 1910, 1912 and 1914),
not least due to the growing national
coal industry which saw potential in
Svalbard.
10
However, both Sweden –
with support from the governments in
Berlin, Paris and London – and Russia,
the main countries party to the
negotiations, rejected these attempts
and suggested joint agreements in these
discussions.
11
A view of a glacier from the helicopter carrying EU foreign-policy chief Catherine Ashton and Norway's foreign minister, Jonas Gahr Stoere, to a climate-research
facility in Svalbard, Norway, March 2012. Courtesy of AP Photo/Scanpix Norway/Berit Roald.
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It was the First World War that
brought change, and at the peace
conference in 1919 Norway was granted
sovereignty over the Spitsbergen
archipelago – the islands between
10–35° East and 74–81° North, an area
also known as the ‘Svalbard Box’.
12
This
particular agreement stemmed from
recognition of Norway’s losses during
the war with regard to both shipping and
industry. Furthermore – and probably
more importantly from a balance-of-
power perspective – none of the great
powers wanted any of their rivals to have
a foothold in the north. The solution was
to give the sovereign rights to Norway and
to attach a clause that the islandswere not
to be used for military purposes.
13
The Concept of Continental
Shelves
The meaning and impact of the Svalbard
Treaty was questioned at various times
after it was signed. While the Soviet
Union agreed bilaterally to the treaty in
1924, and officially signed it in 1935,
14
it later also challenged the status of the
area in discussions held with Norway at
different times throughout the Cold War.
The first true challenges to Norway’s
understanding of the treaty came as a
result of international efforts to define
maritime continental shelves in the
1950s and 1960s. According to the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf (effective from 1964), nations
were entitled to explore the resources
contained within the maritime shelves
extending from the mainland.
15
During
these discussions in the early 1960s
Norway claimed that its continental
shelf extended from the Norwegian
mainland to the north of Svalbard.
Norway also claimed a 4-nautical mile
belt of territorial sea around the Svalbard
islands – a claim which it extended to 12
nautical miles in 2004. Both of these
claims, that the Norwegian mainland
continental shelf went up to and even
beyond Svalbard and in parallel the
definition of territorial seas around
the islands, were Norway’s attempt to
limit the geographical provision of the
Svalbard Treaty to an area smaller than
the Svalbard Box.
Meanwhile, the continued efforts
of the international community to define
continental shelves resulted in a system
of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) – with
Norway establishing its own EEZ in 1976.
A few months later, in 1977, Norway also
established a Fisheries Protection Zone
around the Svalbard islands. This zone
extended to 200 nautical miles, limited
by neighbouring countries to the east
and west, and to Norway’s formal EEZ in
the south. As suggested by its name, the
zone only regulated fishing in the area,
and not the resources under the ocean
floor. Norwegian authorities regarded
the maritime areas outside the Svalbard
islands territorial waters fundamentally
as Norwegian waters, based on the
Norwegian mainland’s continental shelf.
In creating a special ‘Fisheries Protection
Zone’, it is likely that Norway was trying
to limit international debate around its
understanding of the treaty.
However, for the first couple of
decades after the establishment of this
zone, Norway did little to enforce its
stipulations in the area. This changed
from the late 1990s when, with the Cold
War safely in the past, Norway initiated a
clearly tougher regime of controls. Since
then, numerous vessels have been taken
into custody, and companies and nations
have increasingly and vociferously
objected to the Norwegian regime – with
this opposition intensifying over the last
decade.
Norway and International
Disagreement
Norway is interested in securing control
of the natural resources around Svalbard
and has thus been actively promoting its
interpretation of the legal framework and
the Svalbard Treaty. Its communication,
policy and politics have been built around
the premise that the Svalbard Treaty
should be read literally, and should thus
be geographically limited to regulate the
rights of exploration to the islands and
their individual territorial waters.
The main question at stake is
whether the maritime areas beyond
the 12-nautical mile zone around the
Svalbard archipelago are to be regarded
as part of the Norwegian continental
shelf, and thus an extension of Norway’s
EEZ (which, in relation to resources on
the ground, may extend as far as 350
nautical miles from the shoreline), or
whether Svalbard has a continental shelf
and an EEZ of its own and should thus
benefit from ‘equal rights to exploration’
and ‘less taxation’, as stipulated by the
Svalbard Treaty. The position held by
Norwegian officials since 1963 is that the
Norwegian mainland continental shelf
extends up to and beyond Svalbard, all
the way to approximately 84.30° North.
This argument makes Svalbard island a
special legal case, because it claims that
the island does not have the right to a
continental shelf of its own.
16
This was
first officially noted in a Royal Decree of
25 September 1970, followed in 1974 by
a White Paper which stated that ‘Norway
has sovereign rights to these areas,
independent of the Svalbard Treaty’.
The most significant critiques of
the Norwegian position have come
from Russia, the UK, Iceland and Spain,
although other nations have also raised
concerns.
Russia has been primarily concerned
with Norwegian and potentially NATO
military use of the islands, but also
with Norway’s increased focus on
environmental protection (specifically,
the implementation of the Svalbard
Environmental Protection Act of 2001)
and the Fisheries Protection Zone
regime.
17
Further, Åtland and Pedersen
also argue that Russia sees itself as
a ‘privileged party to the treaty’ as
the islands are part of the common
Norwegian-Russian continental shelf, and
Moscow views the Fisheries Protection
Zone as something that applies only
to third parties. Russia has on several
occasions proposed a joint Norwegian-
Russian regulatory system for the
area.
18
However, Norway has stayed
with its understanding of the treaty text
and international law. Despite many
disagreements over the regime however,
the two countries have generally had
good experiences with the Joint Russian-
Norwegian Fisheries Commission since
its establishment in 1974. Today Russia
communicates a dualistic view, arguing
in favour of both the special Russo–
Norwegian relationship (which includes
joint regulatory regimes) and a ‘high
seas’, open-to-all perspective. Russia has
also argued that the treaty regulations
should apply to petroleum blocks in the
entire Svalbard Box area, not just the
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islands and their territorial waters, as
argued by Norway.
19
The UK, and to a lesser degree also
France, West Germany and the US have
since the 1970s been in opposition to
Norway’s so-called ‘Continental Shelf
Doctrine’, as already articulated in their
1978 ‘Consensus Declaration’.
20
In the
mid-1980s, British politicians continued
to argue that Svalbard’s rights should
extend to the island’s own continental
shelf (rather than being limited to its
territorial waters – just 12 nautical
miles).
21
Iceland and Spain have in many
instances over the last two decades
proved to be significant practical
opponents of the Fisheries Protection
Zone, and have been involved in
several incidents which have resulted
in prosecution in Norway. Most notably,
there were two instances in 1994
involving Icelandic vessels, under a
Belize flag, and one of these vessels was
fired upon, using cold-grenades, by the
Norwegian Coast Guard. Similar incidents
took place in 2004 with Spanish trawlers.
All of these cases were taken to court.
22
Both countries have threatened to refer
the case to the International Court of
Justice, but have refrained from doing so
so far.
In 2005, Norway made concerted
bilateral efforts to promote its position
with the US, the UK, Germany, France,
Canada and the EU through the ‘High
North Dialogues’ or the ‘Northern
Dialogues’ (‘nordområdedialogene’).
However, these dialogues may have
backfired, resulting in increased
co-ordinated opposition by the EU, the
UK and others.
23
The extent of their
opposition was demonstrated when the
UK arranged an international conference
on the Svalbard issue in June 2006
without inviting Norway. Since then, there
have been very few official statements
regarding, or plans for, the Svalbard
region. While the public debate has gone
quiet, however, diplomacy continues and
the issue remains contested.
Hydrocarbon Exploration: A
Political Question
The first attempt to search for gas at
Svalbard was made by British company
the English Northern Petroleum
Syndicate in 1920 in Green Harbour. The
next period of petroleum activity came in
the early 1960s, first with the American
oil company Caltex in 1961,
24
and then
when a French oil company indicated its
interest in exploring the shelf in 1964.
25
Neither the early attempts nor the later
ones found any significant deposits.
26
In
1985 Norway announced the opening of
areas up to 74.30° North for exploration,
thus part of the Svalbard Box which starts
at 74° North. This sparked international
protests, especially from the Soviet Union
and the UK. Norway went forward with
establishing the petroleum-block area
‘Barents Sea South’ to 74.30° North;
however, it did not award blocks north
of the 74° North line. As described
by Rolf Tamnes and later repeated by
Torbjørn Pedersen, this was probably
‘a test of other states’.
27
More recently,
Russian company MAGE was granted
permission to conduct hydrocarbon
exploration on the shelf around Svalbard
in 2002. However, while Norway gave its
approval for scientific research, MAGE
used a commercial vessel to undertake
the work and the Russian authorities did
not share the results of this exploration
as the Norwegians had expected.
28
This
created mistrust both on a political level
and in terms of scientific co-operation.
This hints at the greater challenge
for Norway that, should the maritime
areas around Svalbard come to be
regarded as part of the Svalbard Treaty,
this will greatly limit the country’s ability
to create an advantageous taxation
system, consequently giving it no
economic incentive to open up the area
for further exploration. Should Norway
choose, or be forced, to accept that the
maritime areas surrounding the islands
are covered by the Svalbard Treaty, it
will have to give its own citizens and
companies of the signatory nations equal
rights to the resources, and any taxation
it might wish to impose cannot exceed
the funds required for the administration
of Svalbard.
States and the ‘Oil-Industry
Complex’
When the Norwegian Labour Party,
together with the smaller Socialist
Left Party and Centre Party, won the
parliamentary election in 2005, it made
the ‘Declaration of Soria Moria’. This
included a revised and strong policy focus
on the High North, particularly in relation
to security – with the aim of encouraging
NATO to pay increased attention to
Northern Europe – and industry.
29
This
can only be fully understood in light of
the close ties which exist between the
industry and political parties in Norway.
Norway established the state
oil company Statoil in 1972, with the
intention that it would also be a political
tool for building support for Norwegian
public and private interests among the oil
businesses operating in the Norwegian
areas.
30
The company effectively became
the adviser to government bodies in
relation to competing companies, and in
return the state allocated large portions
of the most promising oil fields under
its jurisdiction to its own company.
31
According to former Norwegian Prime
Minister Kåre Willoch, Statoil was
effectively led by Norway’s politicians,
32
although the group’s strong position
within the industry was challenged in the
early 1980s when large parts of it were
privatised. However, Statoil itself was not
privatised until 2001, with the Norwegian
state today holding approximately 68
per cent ownership.
33
Additionally,
Norway retains its traditional preference
for ‘rights of reversion’ – meaning that
rights are only given temporarily. In short,
Norway continues to benefit from a great
tradition of close co-operation and links
between the industry, the unions, and
the politicians and bureaucracy.
34
A parallel, important international
development in the last few decades has
been the growing nationalisation of the
petroleum industry around the world,
either directly by law and taxation or by
increased government involvement in and
ownership of the companies involved. In
the 1970s, approximately 80 per cent of
the oil and gas companies were privately
owned Western corporations.
35
The
industry was dominated by the so-called
‘Seven Sisters’.
36
Today, this has been
reversed and national oil companies
(NOCs) control approximately 80–90 per
cent of the market.
37
National policy and
politics thus become closely intertwined
with the wider industry’s strategies and
agreements, and it will most likely have
consequences, as noted by Robert Pirog
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in an August 2007 report for the US
Congress:
38
Oil-producing nations seem to be
displaying an ever more nationalistic
attitude towards their natural resource
endowments, and the national oil
companies are viewed as custodians of
the resource. If there is opposition to
U.S. foreign policy objectives, or if there
is a more general negative reaction to
the spread of global markets and private
industry, nationalization of oil resources
and transference to the national oil
company is likely one of the most direct
ways to make a political statement.
US scepticismwas likely directly influenced
by the Venezuelan nationalisation of its
industry which had been completed in
May of that year, as well as the enduring
cultural strength of the belief in private
enterprise. Developing oil nations around
the world, on the other hand, have opted
for nationalisation from the start. Pirog
is probably right in his observation that
‘it is likely that the objective for many
national oil companies, as well as the
characteristics of their operations, differ
from companies in the private sector
of the oil industry’.
39
Other analysts
share this view, with Matthew E Chen
and Amy Myers Jaffe stating that ‘Many
Governments use NOCs as a tool to
achieve wider socio-economic policy
objectives, including income redistribution
and industrial development’.
40
In the Norwegian case, shortly after
the ‘Soria Moria’ political programme
was established, the government sealed
several agreements with industry. In 2007,
StatoilHydro was invited to participate
in the development of the Shtokman
gas field in the Barents Sea, following
successful efforts to resolve the dispute
with Russia over the area. Indeed, in
September 2010, the two countries
agreed a Delimitation Treaty inMurmansk,
reflecting their eagerness to survey the
area for hydrocarbon resources. A ‘Barents
2020’ report, written by Arve Johnsen, a
former longstanding and influential CEO of
Statoil, was published by the Norwegian
Foreign Ministry in 2006.
41
In these
examples alone, the close relationship
between politics and industry is clear to
see.
Norway as a Responsible
Environmental Actor
As political discussions on whether
Norway should open up new areas in
the greater High North for hydrocarbon
exploration continue, a parallel debate
is ongoing on special environmental
challenges related to the Svalbard
archipelago and the wider northern
maritime areas.
A possible solution for the
Norwegian politicians may be to prioritise
the environmental issues in those areas
surrounding Svalbard. The environmental
debate encompassing the controversial
question of exploration in the Lofoten
Islands, Vesteraalen and Senja areas
may well influence the discussions
about defining large areas surrounding
Svalbard as nature reserves and
seeking their designation as UN World
Heritage sites. There are great fears
that oil and gas activity in the greater
Lofoten area would threaten the world’s
largest cod stock, the world’s largest
cold water coral reef and mainland
Europe’s biggest seabird colony.
42
If the
Svalbard area is ultimately only of little
economic value to Norway, the solution
may come in the form of a national
political trade-off with the Lofoten
case. As noted by Hans Henrik Ramm, a
former senior adviser to the Norwegian
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and
now an analyst and consultant for the
oil industry, the establishment of new
nature reserves off the coast of Svalbard
will largely hinder future exploration in
the area.
43
Norway’s conservative coalition
government elected in October 2013
has already halted the exploration of
the Lofoten region, while at the point of
writing no concrete political discussions
or decisions have been undertaken with
regards to the maritime areas around
Svalbard. However, the new government
is expected to remain at least as
aggressive regarding the exploration of
the Arctic as its predecessor.
The Challenge is Political, and
the Industry is a Player
The Norwegian government has found
it difficult to generate international
acceptance of its interpretation of the
Svalbard Treaty and its relevance to those
maritime areas more than 12 nautical
miles from the islands. This constitutes
a political challenge, with both security
and industry-related consequences.
Even though the early exploration of
this disputed area may lead to crisis
and conflict, the prospects of successful
exploitation may also positively
contribute towards a compromise
solution.
Should the treaty apply to this area,
all signatory parties should have equal
rights to the resources, and Norway
would probably not be able to benefit
economically from bidding and taxation
on the activity – the latter would have to
be kept at no more than the level needed
for the administration of Svalbard. This
is in great contrast to the 78 per cent
(approximately) Norway gets from
taxation on petroleum activity in its
accepted EEZ. It would not be in Norway’s
interest to open up the areas around
Svalbard to oil and gas exploration if
international disagreement leads to a
non-profit regime for the Norwegian
state. Instead, it could, in line with the
Svalbard Treaty – impose laws and
effectively prohibit any such activity by
imposing environmental-preservation
measures.
Meanwhile, the petroleum
industry is an influential political actor
in its own right, and due to the close
political–industrial relationship in most
nations with interests in the area; it
may become a critical actor by helping
to ‘bridge’ the international dispute
through multinational co-operation. The
principal petroleum industry companies,
linked to the more powerful nations, may
well facilitate agreement on the more
sensitive international political issues.
The states and the petroleum industry
should work together for beneficial
agreements regarding taxation on
licences and production.
For those hoping for exploration,
and for those hoping for a political
solution to the disagreements over
the status of the area, industry may be
a crucial part of the solution. Closely
interwoven with national politics, the
industry has the potential to influence
domestic politics, to support diplomacy
at the international level, and to promote
alternative and compromise solutions to
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the question of taxation. These issues
are important for finding an overarching
solution. Positive dialogue and efforts
towards a political agreement, most likely
a compromise, will further decrease the
prospects of this becoming an area of
conflict between interested nations.
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An Uncertain Future
Regional Responses to Iran’s Nuclear Programme
The Iranian nuclear crisis is not new, but the context in which it now unfolds increasingly
is. Even though an interim deal has been struck, its implementation is not guaranteed;
a next, more comprehensive settlement may be some way off; and states in the region,
including Saudi Arabia, Israel and the Gulf states, remain highly suspicious of Iranian
intentions. While tensions have been reduced, the spectre of a nuclear Iran remains.
This Whitehall Report is based on fieldwork in the greater Middle East, including over
forty interviews of political, diplomatic and military elites. It assesses regional responses
to the broad process of Iranian nuclearisation as it unfolds under historically exceptional
circumstances. It does not assume that Iran will develop nuclear weapons, but explores
how regional powers might respond if it does do so.
Shashank Joshi and Michael Stephens
Whitehall Report 4-13, December 2013
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